At 06:10 the battle was over and all units had ceased fire. The Hood was sunk, the Prince of Wales had received 7 hits (4 from Bismarck and 3 from Prinz Eugen), the Bismarck had been hit 3 times by Prince of Wales while the Prinz Eugen, even if was targeted by the Hood, did not suffer any hit. The Norfolk and the Suffolk had never been targeted by any artillery during this action.
The Prinz Eugen was now on the Bismarck’s starboard side and the battleship was passing ahead, so she increased speed to 32.5 knots to regain the lead of the German formation (65). The RAF “Sunderland” Z/201 came out of the clouds just above the German formation (66) and was immediately targeted by intense anti-aircraft fire. The Prince of Wales was now 18,500 meters from Bismarck and at around 19,000 from Prinz Eugen; the Norfolk was at 21,500 meters to the east and the Suffolk was 28,000 North-West of the German formation.
For some minutes (until 06:19) the Prinz Eugen continued anti-aircraft fire, while the German ships sailed to south-west and the Bismarck was again back on the wake of the German cruiser. At 06:14 they turned again on a course heading of 270° because of another torpedo alarm, while Prince of Wales was now safely at a distance of more than 22,000 meters.
At 06:15 the Prinz Eugen, executing another evasive manoeuvre to avoid torpedoes, went onto the Bismarck’s port side, turning to a course of 320° (67), toward the Suffolk. The Bismarck which was following the cruiser after the turn on 270°, crossed again the Prinz Eugen’s wake.
The Prince of Wales was now at 24,000 meters, the Norfolk was at 21,500 meters while the Suffolk, that was at 28,000 meters, suddenly noticed at 06:16 the Prinz Eugen was closing in fast.
At 06:17 the Bismarck was reducing speed waiting for the Prinz Eugen to come back ahead to the lead position since the cruiser had turned 100° to port, back to a course of 220° .
At 06:18 the Suffolk, now at 26,000 meters from Prinz Eugen, readied to open fire. The Bismarck slowed down on a course of 270°, to allow Prinz Eugen to pass ahead while coming back from her starboard side.
On board the Suffolk, because of an error reading the radar data, they estimated the Prinz Eugen at only 17,800 meters (19,400 yards), while in reality it was at 27,000 meters (29,540 yards), and for this reason the British cruiser opened fire against the German cruiser believing she was closing in (68).
The Suffolk’s first salvo fell well short, followed by the second at 06:20 from her 203 mm guns from 28,000 meters against the Prinz Eugen. The Bismarck reacted turning the main guns forward turrets toward the Suffolk (but did not open fire) while the Prinz Eugen that had just ceased the anti-aircraft fire to the “Sunderland”, was sailing back on the line ahead of the German battleship.
The Norfolk was stationed at 23,000 meters east while the Prince of Wales came out of the smoke screen to fire a salvo from 30,000 meters (32,800 yards) which fell well short of the Bismarck.
At 06:24, the Suffolk, after having fired the sixth and last salvo, noticed that there was clearly something wrong, ceased fire. At the same moment the British cruiser identified an airplane (it was the “Sunderland” Z/201) flying away, above the German formation. Now the Prinz Eugen was back in position on the line ahead of the Bismarck and at 06:25 the two German units were sailing in the original formation with an average interval of 2000 meters after having zeroed the turrets and the guns.
The Norfolk was still at 23,500 meters east, the Prince of Wales 35,000 meters south-east and the Suffolk at 29,000 meters north-west (31,700 yards) from the German ships.
At 06:29 the Suffolk transmitted a radio message to the British Admiralty: “German ships are 18 Nautical Miles (36,000 yards/33,300 meters) on a bearing of 240° from me”; meanwhile she made a circular turn (to keep distance and check radar azimuth references) and resumed shadowing the German warships.
At 06:30 the distance of the Prince of Wales was 41,500 meters south-east (69). The German ships were entering the Atlantic Ocean with Prinz Eugen leading the Bismarck which was following at 2,000 meters on course 220° and a speed 28 knots.
The Battle of the Denmark Strait, initially thought by the British to be a mortal trap for the Bismarck, ended with a victory for the German formation.
The Hood, considered one of the most powerful ships in the world was sunk. The modern Prince of Wales retreated damaged and the Bismarck came out of the battle seriously damaged too.
Now the hunt for the Bismarck had begun, and it was going to end up with her being sunk by the Royal Navy three days after on May 27, 1941, at around 400 nautical miles west of Brest, on the French Atlantic coast (70).
“STORIA militare” and the author would like to thank the following persons : Frank Allen, José M. Rico, George Elder, Robert Winklareth, Randy Stone, John Asmussen, Ulrich Rudofsky, Bill Jurens, Marc Mindnich, Sean Waddingham, Vic Dale, Thorsten Reich, Josef Kaiser, Philippe Caresse, Franco Santovito.
(1) The reversed photo theory, lately proven to have no basis in fact, was published by Robert J. Winklareth, The Bismarck Chase, London, Chatham Publishing, 1997.
(2) The battle film is owned by Bundesarchiv-Potsdam (Berlin) and it is viewable on the internet at : http://www.hmshood.com/ship/history/bshood/film.html
(3) The battle photographs have all been taken from on board the cruiser Prinz Eugen from war reporter Lagemann, which was part of the PK (Propaganda Kompanie). Similarly belonging to the same organization PK were Korvetten Kapitän (reserve) Fritz Otto Busch (director of German war magazine “Kriegsmarine”) and the war artist-painter (Kriegsmaler) Kapitän Lieutenant (reserve) Julius Caesar Schmitz (Westerholt ), all of them on board the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen.
(4) For a complete description of the Operation Rheinubung refer to: Bismarck on “STORIA militare” n. 111 – December 2002 by Enrico Cernuschi.
(5) Ref. ADM 234-509 H.M.S. Suffolk. Paragraph of May 23, 1941 page 157.
(6) Ref. ADM 234-509 H.M.S. Norfolk. Paragraph of May 23, 1941.
(7) Ref. F.O.Busch - Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht- Page 118.
(8) Ref. a) B.B. Schofield, The loss of the Bismarck, page 91. The Norfolk was equipped with a radar model 286 P (working on 1.5 m wavelength) and 2 fixed antenna. The Suffolk was equipped with a radar model 279 and one model 284: the first, working on 1.5 m wavelength with rotating antenna, utilized for spotting; the second one working on a 50 cm wavelength, used for artillery direction.
b) Information confirmed by ADM 234-509 H.M.S. Suffolk on the paragraph Remarks
(9) Ref. ADM 234-509 H.M.S. Suffolk,. Paragraph May 23, 1941, page 158.
(10) Ref. ADM 234-509 H.M.S. Suffolk, Paragraph May 24, 1941, page 159.
(11) Ref. ADM 116-4352 Narrative J.C. Leach – Friday May 23, 1941.
(12) Ref. ADM 116-4352 Narrative J.C. Leach – Saturday May 24, 1941.
(13) War diary - Kriegstagebuch K.T.B Prinz Eugen – Saturday May 24, 1941.
(14) Reference a) Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen – First reference. b) B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck ( Italian edition translated by E. Bagnasco), Parma, Albertelli, 1984. page 140.
(15) Ref. ADM 234-509 H.M.S. Suffolk, Paragraph May 24, 1941, page 160.
(16) Ref. Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen. All other distances are on the graphic are written in hectometres (100 meters) and not in nautical miles (nm = nautical mile, equal 2,020 yards or 1,847 meters). Only this particular reference is written “337° 17 nm “exactly as the Hood transmitted it using his enemy bearing ( 337°) for Prinz Eugen; of course the Hood was 157° bearing from Prinz Eugen.
(17) Ref. War diary - Kriegstagebuch K.T.B Prinz Eugen – saturday May 24, 1941. Time 05.47 : “Allarm ! Smoke on the horizon quickly approaching”.
(18) Ref. Hood guns data, turrets bearing, hits received and related documentation drawing.
(19) Ref. Prince of Wales’s guns data, turrets bearing, hits received and related documentation drawing.
(20) Ref. War diary - Kriegstagebuch K.T.B Prinz Eugen - Saturday May 24, 1941. “Hood and King George (Prince of Wales) on fast approach, distance more than 300 hectometers ”. To be noticed that during the entire engagement the Prince of Wales was always reported as the King George V ( first ship of this class to be built ).
(21) Ref. Supplement to the “London Gazette” of 14 (16) October 1941 – Admiral Sir J. Tovey’s report to the Admiralty – paragraph 17.
(22) References: a) ADM 116-4352 Narrative J.C. Leach – Saturday May 24, 1941. b) Lieutenant Commander Colin Mc Mullen letter ( First Artillery Officer H.M.S. Prince of Wales ) to Sir L. Kennedy regarding the H.M.S. Prince of Wales opening fire at Denmark Strait. c) The Hood survivors reported that their ship fired at least two salvoes to the Prinz Eugen before the order was issued from the Hood command platform to change target to the Bismarck; while J.C. Leach (Prince of Wales) reported that the order to switch target to the right ship was received before both Hood and Prince of Wales opened fire. From the German side, veterans from Prinz Eugen reported that the Hood only fired at them, while the Bismarck survivors reported that Hood fired only on them. The fact remains that the hits the Bismarck received were always associated with the Prince of Wales by their radio reports. d) Lieutenant Commander A.G. Skipwith H.M.S. Prince of Wales spotting Officer reported no Hood shells ever falling in the vicinity of the – D.Mearns R.White book ‘ Hood and Bismarck ‘ Channel 4 books 2001, London pages 99 and 100 – R. Grenfell book ‘ The Bismarck episode ‘ Phanter book 1948 London, pages 41 and 42.
(23) Ref. ADM 234-509 H.M.S. Prince of Wales gunnery report.
(24) Ref. War diary - Kriegstagebuch K.T.B Prinz Eugen - saturday May 24, 1941. “Hood and King George (Prince of Wales) opening fire from 290 hectometres [29,000 meters]”.
(25) B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, page 129 and 130.
(26) Evidence from photos of the Prinz Eugen stern before and after the battle demonstrate the utilization of the depth charges during the engagement as the charges went from 3 to 1.
(27) B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, page 132.
(28) Ref. Official battle report - attachment to KTB Prinz Eugen - by First Artillery Officer Kapitän Lieutenant Paulus Jasper.
(29) F.O.Busch - Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht, page 147. On the command bridge, the commander said smiling to the navigation officer: ‘ Paulus, ( referencing to First Artillery Officer Paulus Jasper ) our fire director has never fired so quickly after having received permission to fire ‘.
(30) Ref. ADM 234-509 H.M.S. Prince of Wales gunnery report. Paragraph E - Notes on enemy fire.
(31) After the first salvo (vollsalve – probably with 2 turrets and 4 guns ) usually a 400 meters scaled salvo sequence was ordered (vier – 4 - hectometres - gabelgruppe) with the next salvoes always using 4 guns: one short, one centred (standsalve or range) and one long. Afterwards a ‘rapid fire’ was ordered on the one of the three that had straddled the target.
(32) Ref. Bismarck guns data, turrets bearing, hits received and related documentation drawing.
(33) Ref. ADM 234-509 - H.M.S. Prince of Wales gunnery report ; salvo plot Enclosure / Attachment IV (a).
(34) Ref. Original battle map of Norfolk and Suffolk during the engagement – Exhibit A.
(35) References: a) F. O. Busch, The story of the Prince Eugen, page 40. b) B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, page 134. c) B.B. Schofield, The loss of the Bismarck, page 34. d) L. Kennedy, Pursuit, page 91. e) ADM 116-4351 Loss of H.M.S. Hood board of inquiry final report, page 37 – 42.
(36) Ref. Hood guns data, turrets bearing, hits received and related documentation drawing.
(37) Ref. a) AIR 14/415. RAF Report Z/201 “Sunderland” Flying Lieutenant R.J. Vaughn. b) Midshipman William Dundas report regarding bodies falling from the Hood, spotting tower probably had been hit. C) ADM 116-4351 Ordinary Signalman Ted Briggs report about a Lieutenant’s body falling from Hood spotting tower. D) Able Seaman R. Tilburn about hit on main tower base room – from ‘The Navy 1939 to the present day ‘’ M. Arthur – Coronet Book 1977 London E) Bruce Taylor - The battlecruiser H.M.S. Hood – Annapolis USNI Press 2005 pages 220 and 221.
(38) Ref. B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, page 142.
(39) Ref. Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen – “Time 05.59 : Change target to the left ship (Wechsel auf Linken Gegner)”.
(40) Ref. Official battle report - attachment to KTB Prinz Eugen - by First Artillery Officer Kapitän Lieutenant Paulus Jasper. “Zielwechsel links auf den 2 gegner, wodurch nunmehr Bismarck und Prinz Eugen uber kreuz schossen’’.
(41) Ref. ADM 116-4351 Loss of H.M.S. Hood board of inquiry final report. Page 198–203 Evidence of ship’s personnel. J.C Leach and Lieutenant Commander G.W. Rowell (H.M.S. Prince of Wales).
(42) Ref. ADM 234-509 - H.M.S. Prince of Wales gunnery report. Salvo plot, Exhibit IV B - bearings and distances when the Hood was hit.
(43) References a) ADM 116-4351 Loss of H.M.S. Hood board of inquiry final report, page 1–59. b) B. Jurens, The loss of H.M.S. Hood in “Warship International” publications.
(44) References: a) B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, page 134. b) F.O.Busch, Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht, page 156.
(45) Ref. Official battle report - attachment to KTB Prinz Eugen - by Second Artillery Officer Kapitän Lieutenant Paul Schmalenbach.
(46) Ref. Letter of July 17, 1941 of Prinz Eugen commander ( Captain H. Brinkmann) about his cruiser torpedo release missing opportunity during the Denmark Strait battle occurred on May 24, 1941 responding to the letter of the board of commission of Admiral Carls (Group Naval North high command ) after having read the report of Vice-Admiral Schmundt (German Cruisers high command ).
(47) Ref. Prince of Wales’s guns data, turrets bearing, hits received and related documentation drawing.
(48) References: a) B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck- Page 136. b) B.B. Schofield, The loss of the Bismarck – Page 36 c) L. Kennedy, Pursuit – Page 95.
(49) References: a) B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck- Page 134. b) F.O.Busch - Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht- Page 159. c) Official battle report - attachment to KTB Prinz Eugen - by Second Artillery Officer Kapitän Lieutenant Paul Schmalenbach.
(50) Ref. Letter of July 10, 1941 by Kapitän Lieutenant E. Reimann Torpedo Officer on board Prinz Eugen responding to Vice-Admiral Schmundt about the missing torpedo release on May 24, 1941 during the battle of Denmark Strait by the Prinz Eugen.
(51) Ref. Letters of Vice-Admiral Schmundt (German Cruisers High Command June 16, 1941 and August 11, 1941); of Admiral Carls (Group Naval North High Command) of July 7, 1941; of Admiral Schniewind (Kriegsmarine Fleet High Command) of July 22, 1941 and of the High Command Inspector of torpedo weapons of August 18, 1941 about the Prinz Eugen missing torpedo launch during Denmark Strait battle on May 24, 1941.
(52) References: a) F. O. Busch, The story of the Prince Eugen, page 46-8; b) B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, page 136-7; c) B.B. Schofield, The loss of the Bismarck, page 36-7; d) L. Kennedy, Pursuit, page 95-96.
(53) Ref. Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen – “Time 06.03. Torpedo noise (Torpedo Gerausche) on bearing 279° ”.
(54) Ref. War diary - Kriegstagebuch K.T.B Prinz Eugen - Saturday May 24, 1941. “Time 06.03: the ship manoeuvre to avoid 3 torpedoes approaching of which the noise had been heard by the listening room (GHG). The torpedoes could have been launched only by the Hood considering distances and bearings, despite the fact that there was an airplane in the vicinity. The tracks of the second and third torpedoes had been viewed personally by the ship commander (Captain H. Brinkmann ) from outside of the command bridge.
(55) The final Hood board of inquiry established that the Hood never opened the torpedo doors, and the order to do so was never given. The airplane “Sunderland” was not torpedo equipped, neither the Norfolk or the Suffolk launched torpedoes. Consequently there were no torpedoes in the water at that moment or during the entire battle.
(56) References : a) Conference of the Führer June 6, 1941 at Berghof Document SKL 885-41; b) OberKommando Kriegsmarine Nr. OKM 15543; c) Bundesarchiv Document Nr. 1448 on Op. Rheinubung; d) F. O. Busch, The story of the Prince Eugen, page 49.
(57) Ref. Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen – “Time 06.05. Turn to port on course 220° ”.
(58) Ref. Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen – “Time 06.06. Torpedo tracks (Torpedo Laufbahn) on bearing 270° ” and “ Time 06.07. Torpedo noise (Torpedo Gerausche) on bearing 345° ”.
(59) Ref. F. O. Busch, The story of the Prince Eugen, page 48 : Paulus Jasper said : “ I should like to know why we are suddenly dashing about the place at high speed like a flying bedstead ! The forward turret group cannot get the target now ! Control from the after platform ! ” because he missed the Commander previous message : ‘’ Ship avoiding torpedo lanes ! ‘’.
(60) Ref. Official battle report - attachment to KTB Prinz Eugen - by First Artillery Officer Lieutenant Paulus Jasper. “At the twenty eighth salvo (counting turret group salvoes from the beginning of fire against the Prince of Wales), the ship had turned so far (away) that [our view] of the target from the foretop was obscured by stack (exhaust) fumes. Simultaneously, the forward turrets were in their extreme turning position (at maximal rotation). I gave the order to transfer [fire control] to 1st Lieutenant Albrecht in the aft (gunnery) position, who continued to fire well-placed, rapid, and partial salvos while keeping the battery on target with minor range corrections until cease-fire”.
(61) References : a) Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen – Ship course and bearing of turrets at 06.07 which demonstrate the impossible use of the forward group (A+B); b) Post battle Prinz Eugen stern photo which shows used cartridges on the upper deck below D turret on the back. Those used cartridges can be there only if the D turret fired straight back thru the stern due to the turret unload mechanism that releases the used cartridges from the back/bottom of the turret.
(62) Ref. Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen - “ Time 06.08. Turn to port on course 220° ”
(63) Ref. Official battle report - attachment to KTB Prinz Eugen - by First Artillery Officer Lieutenant Paulus Jasper. ‘’ During the battle our own ship turned sharply thrice. Firing continued during those turning manoeuvres. The battery was twice temporarily and laterally dislodged from the target in this context. Bismarck came directly into the line of fire after the third avoidance manoeuvre (at 06.08). Accordingly I received the order from the ship’s command: ‘’Do not fire over Bismarck! ‘’ and immediately thereafter: ‘ Cease fire ! ‘’. Firing ceased at 06.09 hours ‘’.
(64) Ref. B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck, page 138-139.
(65) Ref. Official Prinz Eugen speed chart – Speed graphic of May 24, 1941.
(66) Ref. Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen “ Time 06.10, 06.12and 06.13. Airplane alarm ! ( Fliegeralarm ) ”.
(67) Ref. Battle map - Gefecthskizze Prinz Eugen ‘’ Time 06.15. Torpedo noise (Torpedo Gerausche) on bearing 360° ”.
(68) Ref. ADM 234-509. H.M.S. Suffolk. Paragraph May 24, 1941, page 160.
(69) Ref. Official battle map H.M.S. Prince of Wales – Attachment 001B of June 4, 1941.
(70) The Prinz Eugen, once separated from the Bismarck during May 24, 1941 evening, arrived at Brest on June 1, 1941.
Sources and Bibliography
Reconstructed Bismarck War Diary, Part 1/Group North
Prinz Eugen Official War Diary, May 1941
Prinz Eugen Official Battle Map for Denmark Strait
Prinz Eugen official speed chart and machinery log
Prinz Eugen 1st Artillery Officer Report (Kapitän Leutnant Paulus Jasper)
Prinz Eugen 2nd Artillery Officer Report ( Kapitän Leutnant Paul Schmalenbach)
Prinz Eugen Torpedo Officer Report ( Kapitän Leutnant Ernst Reimann) and related maps
Prinz Eugen Commander Report about Torpedo ( Captain Helmuth Brinkmann)
Cruiser Prinz Eugen torpedo related matters regarding the naval engagement on May 24, 1941 Position Statement of the Commander of Cruisers, Vice Admiral Schmundt regarding Prinz Eugen War Diary
Position Statement of Admiral Carls on Prinz Eugen battle conduct.
Position Statement of the Fleet Commander, Admiral Schniewind, regarding Prinz Eugen War Diary
Prinz Eugen Rheinübung original Film from Bundesarchiv-Potsdam ( Berlin)
German Shells Flight Times
Rivista “Signal”. September 1941 – The annihilation of the Hood - Kapitän Leutnant J.C. Schmitz -Westerholt.
Ober Kommando Kriegsmarine – Document Nr. OKM 15543 - Operation Rheinubung SKL document number 885-41 – Admiral Raeder report to A. Hitler at Berghof on June 6, 1941. Bundesarchiv Document Number 1448 – Operation Rheinübung.
Most of the reference document listed can be found on the following Internet sites:
ADM 1/11726 - Loss of H.M.S. Hood in action with German battleship Bismarck: report of Board of Inquiry.
ADM 1/30817 - Loss of H.M.S. Hood in action with German battleship Bismarck: report of Board of Inquiry.
ADM 116/4351 - Loss of H.M.S. Hood in action with German battleship Bismarck: Boards of Inquiry.
ADM 116/4352 -Loss of H.M.S. Hood in action with German battleship Bismarck: Boards of Inquiry.
ADM 234/509 - Sinking of the Bismarck 27 May 1941: Official Dispatches which contains following 4 sections :
1) Admiral Sir John Tovey's Dispatch
2) Narrative of H.M.S. Suffolk Operations 23 - 26 May 1941
3) H.M.S. Norfolk's Gunnery and R.D.F. During Operations against "Bismarck"
4) H.M.S. Prince of Wales Gunnery Aspects Report
AIR 15/415 - Report from Sunderland aircraft of Hood’s loss.
Supplement to the “London Gazette” - Admiral Sir J. Tovey July 5, 1941 Despatch to Admiralty
H.M.S. Suffolk official war diary and battle map.
H.M.S. Norfolk official war diary and battle map.
H.M.S. Prince of Wales official battle map
John Catteral Leach ( H.M.S. Prince of Wales) Narrative Report.
H.M.S. Prince of Wales log for 24 May 1941.
H.M.S. Hood survivors’ interviews.
ADM 1-19140 Sinking of H.M.S. Hood by long range torpedo (inquiry).
Lieutenant Commander Colin William Mc Mullen ( H.M.S. Prince of Wales First Artillery Officer ) letter to Sir L. Kennedy regarding the H.M.S. Prince of Wales opening fire at Denmark Strait.
B. von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship Bismarck (Italian Edition by E. Bagnasco), Parma, Albertelli, 1984.
L. Kennedy, Pursuit, Milano, Arnoldo Mondatori, 1977.
B.B. Schofield, Loss of the Bismarck, Milano, Mursia, 1975.
F.O. Busch, Das Geheimnis der Bismarck, Munchen, Goldmann, 1976. ISBN 3-442-03523-6
F.O. Busch, Prinz Eugen im ersten Gefecht, Gutersloh, C. Bertelsmann, 1943.
F.O. Busch, The story of the Prince Eugen, London, Robert Hale, 1976. ISBN 0-7091-5743-6
R. Grenfell, The Bismarck Episode, London, Panther, 1957.
T.V. Tuleja, Twilight of the Sea Gods, Milano, Longanesi, 1966.
P. Schmalenbach, Kreuzer Prinz Eugen ... unter 3 flaggen, Herford, Koehlers,1985. ISBN 3-7822-0374-7
G. Von Hase, Die Kriegsmarine im Kampf um den Atlantik, Leipzig, Hase & Koehlers, 1942.
D. Mearns - R. White, Hood and Bismarck, London, Channel 4 Books, 2002. ISBN 0-7522-6513-X
M. Skwiot E.T. Prusinowska, Operacja Rheinubung, Gdansk, AJ-Press, 1999. ISBN 83-7237-022-2
S.Breyer – G.Koop, Schlachtschiff Bismarck, Freidberg, Podzun-Pallas, 1990. ISBN 3-7909-0397-3
U. Elfarth – B. Herzog, Schlachschiff Bismarck, Freidberg, Podzun-Verlag, 1975. ISBN 3-7909-0029-X
R. G. Robertson, H.M.S. Hood - Profile Warship Nr. 19,Windsor, Profile Ltd, 1972.
P.Schmalenbach, KM Bismarck – Profile Warship Nr. 18, Windsor, Profile Ltd, 1972
P.Schmalenbach, KM Prinz Eugen – Profile Warship Nr. 6, Windsor, Profile Ltd, 1971
P. Caresse, Un cuirasse a detruire : Le Bismarck, Lela Press, 2004
W. Jurens, The loss of H.M.S. Hood in “Warship International” publications.